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Abstract
From a global perspective, the single most noticeable fact about corporate governance is 
the radical dichotomy between dispersed ownership and concentrated ownerships systems, 
with the latter being much in the majority. Several prominent academics have offered 
grand theories to explain when dispersed share ownership arises, which have emphasized 
either legal or political preconditions. Nonetheless, mounting evidence suggests that these 
theories are overgeneralized and, in particular, do not account for the appearance (to 
varying degrees) of dispersed ownership in all securities markets. This article concludes 
that neither legal rules nor political conditions can adequately explain the spread of 
dispersed ownership across both the U.S. and the U.K., which developments occurred 
at different times, in different political and legal environments, and were precipitated 
by different exogenous factors. Instead, this article offers an alternative and simpler 
explanation: dispersed ownership arises principally from private ordering, with legal rules 
playing a minor role at best. Intermediaries - investment bankers, stock exchanges, and 
others - fi ll the void created by legal shortcomings and create bonding mechanisms that 
allow dispersed ownership to spread beyond the limited geographic area in which the 
founding entrepreneur is known and trusted. This process has two steps: (1) the appearance 
of numerous minority shareholders, gradually spreading across a broad geographic area, 
and (2) the break-up of controlling blocks. At the latter stage, historical contingencies 
have played a major role. In the United States, the merger boom of the 1890s played a 
critical role, and in the U.K. punitive tax changes compelled controlling shareholders to 
sell. The only common denominators across the two countries were: (1) political changes 
followed once share ownership dispersion was achieved, as law followed the market; 
and (2) private ordering and self-regulation encouraged minority owners to invest and 
protected their voting and control rights. This may suggest that in decentralized political 
economies (in which political and economic power tend to be separated and in which self-
regulation is more common, such as the U.S. and the U.K.), dispersed ownership is more 
likely to arise, but it can arise for individual fi rms through private ordering in any market.
Keywords: Bonding, concentrated ownership, corporate governance, dispersed owner-
ship, institutional investor, investment bankers, liquidity/control tradeoff, merger wave, 
self-regulation, stock exchanges
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Introduction 
 From a global perspective, the most salient fact about corporate governance is its 
seemingly binary character. At least at first glance, the world divides neatly into two 
categories:  (1) “concentrated ownership” systems, and (2) “dispersed ownership” 
systems, with the former being far more common. In the former system, a controlling 
shareholder, a family group, or a small number of blockholders holds either majority or 
de facto control and places their representatives on the controlled firm’s board of 
directors.1 In the latter system, there is instead a “separation of ownership and control” 
with neither the directors nor the senior executives typically holding significant blocks of 
the company’s stock and with share ownership instead being dispersed among many 
institutional and retail shareholders.2 Defining elements of this latter system also include 
(1) an independent board, whose members will typically have no business relationships 
with the corporation, and (2) relative investor passivity, at least to the extent that highly 
diversified institutional investors do not seek to actively manage the business or 
participate in most managerial decisions.  
 Much hangs on this difference in the structure of share ownership, as the nature of 
the agency costs faced by shareholders depends upon ownership structure. In the 
                                                 
1
 Marco Becht and Colin Mayer found that, as of 2001, in the majority of European companies a single 
voting block held a majority of the voting shares, whereas in the U.S. and the U.K., the corresponding 
figure was less than 3%. See Marco Becht and Colin Mayer, “Introduction” in Fabrizio Barca and Marco 
Becht (eds.), THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE (2001). 
2
 This is, of course, a one sentence summary of the Berle/Means thesis, which announced that a “separation 
of ownership and control” had left professional managers running U.S. public corporations. See Adolf A. 
Berle and Gardiner C. Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
Debate still continues as to the accuracy of the Berle/Means thesis, with some maintaining that the 
separation is less complete or prevalent than those authors claimed. For a thorough review of this debate 
and a guarded re-affirmation of the Berle/Means thesis, see Brian Cheffin and Steven Bank, “Is Berle and 
Means Really a Myth?,” ECGI Law Working Paper No. 121 (2009), (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352605). It is, of course, true that many U.S. and U.K. firms do have controlling 
shareholders. 
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dispersed ownership structure, managers have broad discretion, can act opportunistically, 
and need to be monitored and constrained by an independent board. In the concentrated 
ownership structure, the focus of monitoring shifts from the manager to the controlling 
shareholder.3 Moreover, the prospect of a truly independent board is less likely when 
ownership is concentrated, and thus alternative protections that do not depend upon board 
oversight must be found. 
 Commentators commonly refer to the dispersed ownership structure as the 
“Anglo-Saxon model” of corporate governance, because only in two “Anglo-Saxon” 
countries – the United States and the United Kingdom – does the structure of share 
ownership appear to conform relatively closely to the foregoing profile of “dispersed 
ownership” systems.4 Elsewhere, concentrated ownership tends to predominate (with a 
few countries falling between these two poles and with Canada actually having evolved 
to dispersed ownership only to regress back to family-controlled concentrated 
ownership5). 
 Still, this binary perspective oversimplifies. Although the contrast between 
“dispersed” and “concentrated” ownership as divergent systems of corporate governance 
is basically accurate, this dichotomy can mislead in at least two respects:  
                                                 
3
 For an overview of these differences in agency costs, see John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate 
Scandals:  Why the U.S. and Europe Differ, 21 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 198-211 (2005). How 
closely the U.S. and the U.K. conform to the Berle/Means or Anglo-American model remains open to 
debate. See Cheffins and Bank, supra note 2. 
4
 Debates have long continued over the relative superiority of the “Anglo-Saxon Model” vs. European or 
concentrated ownership models of corporate governance. For a review of the empirical evidence, see Klaus 
Gugler and Dennis Mueller, Corporate Governance and the Returns on Investment, 47 J. Law & Econ. 589 
(2004). For a strong assertion of the superiority of the European model over the Anglo-Saxon model, see 
Michel Albert, CAPITALISM vs. CAPITALISM at 160-190 (1993). 
5
 See Randall K. Morck, Michael Perry, Gloria Y. Tian, and Bernard Yeung, “The Rise and Fall of the 
Widely Held Firm:  A History of Corporate Ownership in Canada,” in Randall K. Morck (ed.), A 
HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD (2005) at 65-148. 
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 First, its implicit message of Anglo-American exceptionalism is highly 
questionable. The assumption that something about the common heritage of the “Anglo-
Saxon” countries – their common law, politics, cultural heritage, or whatever –  explains 
their unique convergence on a “dispersed ownership” system of corporate governance 
simply does not hold up under closer analysis. After all, Australia and Canada have 
origins at least as “Anglo-Saxon” as the United States, probably deriving their law to an 
even greater degree from British sources, but in these countries concentrated ownership is 
more common than dispersed ownership. Curiously, the nation with the next highest level 
of dispersed ownership to the U.S. and the U.K. is probably Japan, hardly an Anglo-
Saxon country, but one where a former network of cross-ownership among firms in the 
same corporate group has become increasingly attenuated, resulting in a high level of 
ownership dispersion.6 
 Second, an even more fundamental problem with attempts to attribute dispersed 
ownership to a particular set of legal or political circumstances is that companies with 
dispersed ownership are present in virtually all developed economies.7 Although 
concentrated ownership clearly predominates in most of the world, individual firms with 
                                                 
6
 Japan has recently experienced “steep declines in cross-shareholding and stable shareholding,” and the 
shareholdings of Japanese commercial banks in Japanese public corporations fell from 16% in 1992 to 6% 
in 2004. See Curtis Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware:  The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 
Colum. L. Rev. 2171, 2184-85 (2005). Offsetting this decline has been an increase in the ownership in 
Japanese corporations held by foreign investors, most of whom are activist institutional investors. Id. at 
2185-86. 
7
 See Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the 
World, 54 J. Fin. 471-517 (1999) (surveying shareholder ownership structure in the 27 most developed 
countries). Using a definition of control under which a 20% shareholder is deemed to hold control, they 
find only two countries (Argentina and Mexico) among the 27 countries surveyed in which none of the 20 
largest corporations in that jurisdiction was “widely held.” Id. at 492 (Table II, Panel A). Using the lower 
threshold of 10% to define control, they find that three more countries join this short list (Belgium, Portugal 
and Sweden). Id. at 493 (Table II, Panel B). Otherwise, twenty-two out of these 27 largest economies had 
some “widely held” public corporations among their twenty largest companies (ranked by market 
capitalization). 
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broadly dispersed ownership can be identified in all major securities markets. Thus, 
although some commentators argue that dispersed ownership survives only in the 
presence of strong legal protection for minority shareholders,8 the actual data that they 
present undercuts this claim. Specifically, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer find 
that even in countries with “poor” shareholder protection, “widely held” large firms still 
constitute 27% of the large firms in their sample.9 Even when one shifts one’s focus from 
large firms to “medium-sized firms,” the global percentage of “widely held” firms among 
“medium-sized firms” falls only to 24%, and, most surprisingly, in countries with “poor” 
shareholder protection, such “widely held” firms still account for 13% of all “medium 
sized” firms.10 In short, the difference is relative, not absolute. Even if firms with 
dispersed ownership are a modest minority in many countries, such firms persist in nearly 
all markets, regardless of the prevailing legal rules. 
 In turn, this fact that a minority of dispersed ownership firms co-exists with a 
majority of concentrated ownership firms in most securities markets confounds attempts 
to explain dispersed ownership as a function of any single variable. Apparently, dispersed 
ownership can survive even in an inhospitable legal climate. More generally, dispersed 
ownership appears to be neither the winner or loser in a Darwinian evolution toward the 
most competitive business form, because both dispersed and concentrated ownership 
seem to be persisting at relatively stable levels. Ultimately, there may some day come an 
“end to history” with one system dominating the other, but for the present the contest 
remains undecided. 
                                                 
8
 This is the essential position taken by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer. 
9
 LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer, supra note 7, at 496. 
10
 Id. at 497. 
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 Predictably, the sharp dichotomy between dispersed ownership and concentrated 
ownership systems has attracted the attention of theorists who have sought to explain 
contemporary patterns of share ownership by identifying an underlying cause or variable 
that explains the evolution towards dispersed ownership in some countries and its relative 
absence elsewhere. “Lumpers” rather than “splitters” in this article’s terminology,11 these 
theorists – some stressing law; some, politics – have shared a strong assumption of path 
dependency:  namely, that business firms necessarily evolved in one direction because 
other alternative trajectories were foreclosed.  
 This article disagrees, arguing instead that the evidence is more consistent with a 
simpler alternative explanation:  dispersed ownership resulted less from inexorable forces 
and more from private ordering. Neither legal nor political conditions mandated or 
prevented the appearance of dispersed ownership. Rather, entrepreneurs, investment 
bankers, and investors – all seeking to maximize value – sometimes saw reasons why 
selling control into the public market would maximize value for them. But when and 
why? That is this article’s focus. It will argue that law played less of a role than 
specialized intermediaries – investment banks, securities exchanges, and other agents – 
who found it to be in their self-interest to foster dispersed ownership and who 
compensated for weak legal protections. Initially, relying on reputational capital, self-
regulatory institutions and contractual mechanisms, entrepreneurs found ways to assure 
                                                 
11
 In academic parlance, “lumpers” are those who seek broad gestalt-like patterns, and emphasize 
similarities, rather than differences. Splitters tend in turn both to focus on differences and to emphasize 
institutional detail. Lumpers may also be thought of as meta-level theorists who operate at a high level of 
generality and abstraction, while splitters tend to function at a lower level of altitude and to concentrate on 
specific legal or institutional detail. Splitters accuse lumpers of overgeneralization, and lumpers retort that 
splitters focus on differences without distinctions. No suggestion is here intended that one is usually right 
and the other usually wrong. But the dialogue betweent the two sides is essential. 
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investors that they would not be exploited if they invested in their companies as minority 
shareholders. This resulted in a localized dispersion of ownership with control remaining 
with the founder/entrepreneur. Private ordering, not mandatory legal rules, facilitated this 
process of trust formation. Later, partly as the result of exogenous changes involving the 
tax and antitrust laws in the U.S. and U.K., founders (or their heirs) did pass control to 
public shareholders. Again, investment bankers and stock exchanges facilitated this 
transition. Only once this passage occurred and dispersed ownership had taken root in a 
jurisdiction, did a new political constituency of minority shareholders coalesce (usually 
following a stock market crash) to demand legislation, enhanced legal protections, and 
improved disclosure.  
 Under this view, law followed the market, and did not create the preconditions 
that explain the market’s evolution towards dispersed ownership. From this perspective, 
some level of dispersed ownership would arise in all markets (as we do observe), but 
whether it predominated would depend largely on whether the firm’s founders believed 
they could maximize their profits by selling control in the public market.  
 Put differently, the choice that most needs explanation is why the founders of a 
firm would decide to sell control into the public market, rather than either retaining 
control or selling it at a premium to a new incoming controlling shareholder. Of course, 
at an abstract level, the answer has to be that entrepreneurs anticipated a higher premium 
from a sale of their controlling blocks into the public market, rather than to a new 
controlling shareholders. But why did such sales seems more attractive in those 
jurisdictions (chiefly the U.S. and the U.K.) that eventually became characterized as 
dispersed ownership countries? Here, even a partial answer requires that attention be 
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given to other legal developments, including the antitrust laws in the U.S. and the tax 
laws in the U.K., that encouraged or necessitated such sales.  
 Ultimately an adequate explanation of the passage of control from controlling 
families to public shareholders compels us to face an added complexity:  public investors 
will not rationally pay a premium for control unless they can retain that control in their 
hands. The key issue then is the sustainability of control in public hands. If control can be 
divested from public shareholders by a new control seeker who conducts a secret 
“creeping” acquisition in a dispersed ownership market and pays little or no premium, 
then the public shareholders made a strategic misjudgment in earlier paying a premium 
for a controlling interest that they could not retain. Over time, they will learn not to repeat 
this mistake, and so control, even if briefly dispersed, will predictably reconcentrate.  
 Indeed, this pattern of short-lived dispersed ownership is apparent in recent 
corporate history. When Russia and Eastern Europe privatized in the 1990s through mass 
privatizations, dispersed ownership proved to be a very transient phenomenon – precisely 
because it could not be protected and preserved in the hands of public shareholders.12 
This experience frames the key question:  what was different in the U.S. and U.K. history 
that enable dispersed ownership to persist? How were public shareholders able to retain 
control? In truth, the early U.S. experience resembled that of Russia and Eastern Europe 
in the 1990s.13 But, as will be seen, private ordering and strong intermediaries mitigated 
                                                 
12
 See generally Simon Johnson, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer & Robert 
Vishny, Tunneling, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 22 (2002) (giving examples from Eastern Europe and Russian 
privatization); John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons From Securities 
Market Failure, 25 J. Corp. L. 1 (1999). 
13
 “Tunneling” is a new word, developed by economists to characterize egregious self-dealing that loots an 
enterprise. But it could have been easily applied to the Erie Railroad in the 19th Century, when that railroad 
became known as the “Scarlet Lady of Wall Street” because of rampant self-dealing by insiders. See John 
Steele Gordon, THE SCARLET LADY OF WALL STREET (1988). 
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the level of predatory opportunism in both the U.S. and the U.K. – and in the absence of 
strong legal protections for minority shareholders. 
 Against this backdrop, Part II and III will examine the emergence of dispersed 
ownership in both the United States and the United Kingdom. It will find roughly the 
same sequence of events (although occurring at different points in time) under which 
legal reforms followed, and did not precede, the rise of dispersed ownership. In overview, 
the evidence shows that:  
 (1) dispersed ownership arose at markedly different times in these two countries 
(much earlier in the United States than in the U.K.);  
 (2) it evolved in a markedly different fashion (with dispersed ownership 
preceding the appearance of institutional investors in the U.S. and following their rise in 
the U.K.);  
 (3) in the U.S., investment bankers and the New York Stock Exchange had strong 
incentives to encourage control sales into the public markets and played a critical role in 
protecting the maintenance of control in public hands;  
 (4) although legal rules did play some role in encouraging the transition to 
dispersed ownership, these legal rules had little to do with shareholder protection. 
Instead, in the United States, an unprecedented merger wave at the end of the 19th 
Century, which may have been induced in part by the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act of 1890, hastened the transition toward dispersed ownership. Correspondingly, in the 
U.K., tax changes, enacted during and after World War II, penalized controlling 
shareholders and induced them to sell to institutional investors (who were relatively 
immune from these same tax disincentives).  
-10- 
 
 The U.S. and the U.K. thus present distinctly different stories, but they share at 
least one common denominator:  in neither country was this evolution toward dispersed 
ownership significantly influenced by the prior existence of strong legal rules that 
protected minority investors. If anything, legal rules in both countries were more part of 
the problem than part of the answer. Instead, intermediaries – investment banks, stock 
exchanges and institutional investors – engaged in extensive private ordering to facilitate 
the rise of dispersed ownership. Also in both countries, legal rules protecting public 
shareholders were eventually adopted, but only after the transition to dispersed ownership 
had first taken hold. 
 Part IV will then assess what common characteristics can be found in the U.S. and 
U.K. experiences. It concludes that in both, law followed the market with the result that 
legal changes came after, not before, the transition to dispersed ownership, as a new 
constituency of public shareholders lobbied for legislative change. It also hypothesizes 
that the absence of a strong central government intent on managing economic 
development distinguishes both the U.S. and U.K. experiences from that of Continental 
Europe; in essence, the laissez-faire policies of both governments toward issues of 
corporate governance gave a greater role to private ordering. 
 Part V will turn to a final problem:  why does the “Anglo-Saxon” system of 
dispersed ownership persist? Why do institutional investors today not assert themselves 
and assume control, rather than maintain a basically passive “hands off” approach that 
leads them to intervene only when the incumbent management appears to have become 
dysfunctional? Even if there were once political and/or legal constraints in the U.S. that 
prevented such institutional control of large public corporations, those constraints have 
-11- 
 
recently eroded with the rise of hedge funds and private equity. Today, retail share 
ownership has declined to roughly 25% of the stock in U.S. public corporations,14 while 
institutions hold the majority. Hence, past barriers to institutional control no longer 
appear formidable.  
 This article will answer this question of why institutions do not typically seek 
control with a provocative assertion:  institutional investors do not really want control. 
The logistical demands required of any institutional investor that seeks to manage 
actively a large portfolio of companies through collective decision-making by multiple 
institutions are simply unacceptably costly. As a result, institutional investors implicitly 
recognize a basic “liquidity/control” tradeoff that leads them to avoid active involvement 
in managerial decision-making, except under special circumstances.15 In particular, two 
factors that are neither “legal” nor “political” in nature constrain institutional investors 
from exercising control:  (i) the cost differential between a low-cost policy of indexed 
diversification and a more activist, but high-cost, policy of attempting to monitor 
corporate managements over a broad portfolio of investments, and (ii) the collective 
action problems that institutional investors face in funding interventions in corporate 
governance. In combination, these two factors have led most institutional investors (both 
in the U.S. and the U.K.) to prefer liquidity to control. It can, of course, be debated 
whether this preference will continue under all future market conditions and regulatory 
structures, but the fact that this preference has now persisted in both the U.S. and the 
                                                 
14
 See J. Choper, J. Coffee and R. Gilson, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 15 (7th ed. 
2008) (showing share ownership breakdown in the U.S.). 
15
 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 
Colum. L. Rev. 1277 (1991) (developing concept of liquidity/control tradeoff). 
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U.K. for at least several decades suggests that it is likely to endure – at least absent major 
changes in the market and regulatory environment. 
I. Theories of Share Ownership Structure 
 When Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means announced in 1932 their discovery that 
ownership and control had separated,16 scholars assumed that they knew what explained 
this development:  family-controlled companies could not finance the growth and 
investment that industrialization necessitated. Dispersed ownership, it was assumed, 
followed from the enormous capital needs of an industrialized economy undergoing rapid 
technological development. Only much later did the weakness in this argument become 
apparent when mounting evidence began to show in the late 20th Century that German 
and Japanese companies were competing successfully with American corporations in 
basic industries, notwithstanding the fact that they operated within a concentrated 
ownership framework.  
 This recognition posed a puzzle for academics:  if dispersed ownership was not 
inevitable, what then explained the phenomenon of dispersed ownership? The initial 
academic response was Mark Roe’s political theory of corporate governance, most fully 
articulated in his 1994 book, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS,17 which 
argued that dispersed ownership was the product (at least in the United States) of a strong 
populist distrust of concentrated financial power. Still, as later discussed, this theory 
faced major problems. Most notably, it could not explain the United Kingdom, which 
also had dispersed ownership but no similar history of resistance to large financial 
                                                 
16
 See Berle and Means, supra note 2. 
17
 Mark J. Roe, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: The Political Roots of American Corporate 
Finance (1994). 
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institutions or of regulatory policies that discouraged financial institutions from taking 
collective action to influence board decisions. Yet, as later discussed, in the U.K. as well 
as the U.S., institutional investors have remained largely passive. 
 Meanwhile, during the 1990s, the Soviet Union crumbled, and wholesale 
privatizations of formerly state-owned firms occurred across Eastern Europe and Russia. 
In the wake of rapid and often poorly designed privatizations, fraud became endemic, and 
ownership that was initially widely dispersed through voucher privatizations swiftly re-
concentrated into the hands of a few controlling shareholders. Frustrated by the fraud and 
predatory behavior they had witnessed at close hand, the academics who had helped 
design and orchestrate Russian privatization developed a second and alternative theory to 
explain dispersed ownership. Dispersed ownership, they explained, was the product of 
strong legal rules that protected minority shareholders from exploitation by controlling 
shareholders. Although this theory had an empirical foundation, replete with elaborate 
regressions, it was the product of a particular historical moment that may have led its 
authors to overemphasize the role of law.  
 Each of these theories is examined in more detail below: 
 A. The “Law Matters” Thesis 
 In the wake of the privatizations in Russia and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, 
dispersed ownership proved to be a transient phenomenon. “Tunneling” and other 
predatory practices, often involving egregious self-dealing, depleted the assets and 
revenues of privatized firms, allowing managers and controlling shareholders to exploit 
-14- 
 
minority shareholders.18 This experience understandably led academics who had worked 
on privatization to reach a seemingly logical conclusion:  dispersed ownership could 
persist only in those countries that had laws that effectively protected minority 
shareholders from unfair self-dealing and other forms of overreaching by dominant 
shareholders. If the law protected minority shareholders, they reasoned, then controlling 
shareholders would have less ability to exploit the private benefits of control. In turn, as 
the private benefits of control that could be expropriated by controlling shareholders 
declined, the incentive to assemble control blocks would in turn decline and existing 
blocks might be liquidated, thus enabling dispersed ownership to develop (or persist). 
 Starting from this premise that ownership concentration is a consequence of weak 
legal protection of minority shareholders, four financial economists – LaPorta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (commonly referred to as “LLS&V”) – developed an 
extraordinarily influential (but equally controversial) model of how to measure the 
strength of the legal protections accorded minority shareholders. They constructed a six 
element “anti-director rights” index to rate the strength of legal protections accorded 
minority shareholders. Using this index, they found a statistically significant correlation 
between the “quality” of corporate law, as rated by their index, and the degree of 
shareholder dispersion.19 In later work, largely this same group of authors moved beyond 
their initial “anti-director rights” index and constructed other indices in order to measure 
                                                 
18
 See sources supra at note 12. 
19
 See Rafael LaPorta et. al, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997); Rafael 
LaPorta et. al, Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998). 
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either the specific protections accorded shareholders against self-dealing20 or the 
adequacy of the country’s securities laws.21 These later indices focused more on 
enforcement (both public and private), and again the authors found statistically 
significant correlations between their indices measuring the strength of enforcement and 
various measures of stock market development.22 
 LLS&V’s findings have elicited a legion of critics. First, there have been 
penetrating methodological critiques of their work. Some have reported that LLS&V’s 
coding was inaccurate and inconsistent and in particular that errors associated with their 
coding of their shareholder rights indices accounted for the strength of their results.23 
Others have criticized the highly selective quality of their indices, arguing that the few 
variables chosen did not serve as accurate proxies for the underlying system’s legal 
rules.24 In later work, the principal LLS&V authors have acknowledged the legitimacy of 
these criticisms.25 
                                                 
20
 See Simeon Djankov, Rafael LaPorta, Florenco Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, The Law and 
Economics of Self-Dealing (2005) NBER Working Paper 11883 (hereinafter, “Law and Economics Self-
Dealing”). 
21
 See Rafael LaPorta, Florenco Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 
61 J. Fin. 1 (2006). 
22
 However, in Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, only ex post private enforcement showed any 
statistically significant correlation with ownership dispersion. This led the authors to conclude that private 
enforcement worked, while public enforcement appeared not to. This conclusion has attracted much (and 
deserved) criticism. See Howell E. Jackson and Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities 
Laws:  Resource-Based Evidence, (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-28) 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000086) (concluding that public enforcement is at least as effective as private 
enforcement).  
23
 See Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of LaPorta et. al’s “Anti-Director Rights 
Index Under Consistent Coding (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 67/2006); Holger Spamann, “Law and 
Finance” Revisited (Harvard Law School John M. Olio Center Discussion Paper No. 12, 2008); Sofie 
Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe:  
Distribution of Powers, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 697 (2005). 
24
 John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution 
of Bankruptcy Law:  Lessons from the U.K., 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1699-1785 (2002). 
25
 See Simeon Djankov, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law and 
Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. Fin. Econ. 430 (2008). 
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 A second problem has been the direction of causality. Even if LLS&V’s anti-
director rights were in fact correlated with greater dispersed ownership, did this mean that 
they had produced dispersed ownership? Or could these legal rights have been instead the 
product of dispersed ownership, as a broad coalition of public shareholders, once formed, 
came to demand legislative protection that produced the legal rules picked up in 
LLS&V’s anti-director index.26 Although LLS&V never examined the historical origins 
of the legal variables on their anti-directors index, others have and found that several are 
of fairly recent origin, having been adopted well after dispersed ownership became the 
dominant structure in the U.S. and U.K.27 In short, law may well have followed 
economics, with the development of dispersed ownership causing a shift in legal rules in 
those countries where it became prevalent. 
 In response to this problem of endogeneity, the LLS&V authors shifted their 
focus. Instead of measuring the “quality of law” by tabulating the existing or non-
existence of specific legal rights, they moved in later work to a more generalized 
hypothesis:  namely, that the quality of legal institutions varied systematically with the 
“origin” of a country’s legal system. Here, they divided the world’s legal systems into 
basically four categories:  (1) Anglo-American common law systems, (2) French civil 
law systems, (3) German civil law systems; and (4) Scandinavian civil law systems. This 
shift appears to have been an effort to deal with the direction of causality, because these 
legal families predated the Industrial Revolution and the spread of the corporate form. 
                                                 
26
 For this view, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership:  The Role of Law and the State 
in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L. J. 1 (2001). 
27
 For example, see Brian R. Cheffins, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: British Business 
Transformed (2008) at 358-359 (noting that the high level at which prospectus disclosure regulation in the 
U.K. was rated by LLS&V was the result only of a 1986 legislative change, which formalized certain pre-
existing stock exchange rules). In short, the dating was arbitrary. 
-17- 
 
Given this clear timing difference, it could not be plausibly argued that either the 
structure of share ownership or the level of economic development had caused or 
influenced a country’s legal origins. Legal origins were thus a truly independent variable. 
 Still, even if they had thus resolved the problem of causation to their own 
satisfaction, the attempt to use legal origins to explain economic development created 
even greater controversy. LLS&V reported that countries whose legal origins derived 
from the civil law systems (and, worst of all, French civil law systems) exhibited the 
lowest protections for minority shareholders; in turn, lower shareholder protection 
correlated with high levels of concentrated share ownership. Conversely, higher quality 
corporate, securities, and bankruptcy laws were found to be associated with common law 
systems. Because these latter jurisdictions provided higher levels of protection for 
minority shareholders, it was no surprise to LLS&V that corporations incorporated in 
those jurisdictions exhibited more dispersed share ownership, paid out greater dividends, 
and generally had higher share prices than firms incorporated in civil law jurisdictions. 
 Nonetheless, this revised “legal origins” approach was equally fraught with 
methodological peril. LLS&V’s division of all legal systems with four categories – 
common law, French, German, and Scandinavian – may have worked for Europe, but 
outside of Europe the appropriate classification of the legal systems of countries in Asia, 
Africa, Latin America and even Eastern Europe remains highly debatable.28 For example, 
while LLS&V deemed China and Japan to be countries of German legal origin, China’s 
corporation law actually derives from Taiwan, France and Japan as well. In the case of 
Japan, although Japan borrowed much German civil law at the end of the 19th Century, its 
                                                 
28
 For an overview of these problems, see Mathias Siems, Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative 
Law, 52 McGill L. J. 55 (2007). 
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corporate and securities law were taken nearly intact from the United States after World 
War II. Latin America is even more ambiguous, as its law was borrowed from Spanish 
sources that were, at most, only briefly influenced by France prior to South America’s 
wars of independence.29 Indeed, the strength of LLS&V’s correlation between the 
“quality” of the common law and the superior economic development in countries with 
common law legal systems depends heavily on the ambiguous status of Latin America.30 
Yet, however we classify Latin America in terms of its legal origins, the possibility looms 
large that its relatively poor economic development may be the product of unrelated 
factors (poor economic endowments, a weak political tradition, a history of military 
dictatorship, etc.) that had little, if anything, to do with specific legal rules.31 
 A final problem is that there is evidence that some “civil law” countries did 
develop strong securities markets, but later reversed policies and discouraged their further 
growth and development.32 This suggests that politics could trump law and that political 
attitudes could change abruptly. To sum up: even if U.K. and the U.S. developed stronger 
securities markets, the debate remains open as to whether this development was the 
product of politics, law, or more general factors in their social structure. Precisely 
                                                 
29
 The Napoleonic influence of French law on Latin America seems to have been short-lived, while the 
influence of U.S. law may have had a far longer duration. See Kenneth Dam, THE LAW-GROWTH 
NEXUS: The Rule of Law and Economic Development, 42-45 (2006). 
30
 Id. at 42-45 (arguing that low economic growth in Latin America explains the difference between the 
economic performance of common law and French civil law countries and doubting that Latin America 
should be classified as of French civil law origin). 
31
 For the views that geography and colonial endowments better explain variations in postcolonial 
economic growth, see Jared Diamond, GUNS, GERMS AND STEEL: The Fates of Human Societies 
(1997), and Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical 
Investigation, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 1369, 1372-73 (2001). 
32
 See Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals:  The Politics of Financial 
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. Fin. Econ. 5, 14-17 (2003). This shift away from financial 
development could have been motivated by the desires of commercial banks to slow the development of 
rival institutions, or because finance ministries wanted greater control over the allocation of capital and to 
spur defense-related industries. 
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because both countries were decentralized and adopted common laissez-faire positions 
toward economic planning and corporate development, their governmental inaction may 
have fostered private law-making and robust self-regulatory institutions (such as stock 
exchanges).33 
 B. The “Politics Matters” Thesis 
 In 1994, Mark Roe announced a thesis that was provocative, iconoclastic and 
path-breaking:  the structure of shareholder ownership in the U.S. was determined not by 
economic efficiency, but by political constraints.34 Because the U.S. historically 
disfavored concentrated financial power, the bank-centered system of financial control of 
public corporations that had arisen in Europe and Japan could not develop in the United 
States, and so shareholder ownership stayed dispersed, rather than concentrated. The 
book was widely and deservedly heralded, in large part because it seemed to show that 
political factors could and did trump economic efficiency. In retrospect, however, his 
specific thesis seems much influenced by the then seeming superiority of Japanese and 
German corporate governance.35 Within just years of his statement of this thesis, 
Japanese and German corporate governance faded in their seeming efficiency. But Roe’s 
thesis persisted in its popularity, because it focused scholars on the political factors that 
might determine economic structure (and thus encouraged scores of political science 
graduate students to explore a range of possibilities). 
                                                 
33
 For a fuller development of this argument, see Coffee, supra note 26, at 59-64. 
34
 See Roe, supra note 17. 
35
 Professor Roe had a year earlier focused on the advantages of German and Japanese corporate 
governance. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and the United 
States, 102 Yale L. J. 1927 (1993). 
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 Nonetheless, original as his thesis was, it faces some basic problems:  First, the 
most obvious indications that the U.S. political system disfavored concentrated financial 
power came after the advent of the separation of ownership and control.36 Second, 
simpler explanations are possible for the underdeveloped size of U.S. financial 
institutions. Early in his book, Roe focuses on the fragmentation of banking power in the 
United States, but this fragmentation does not really require a political theory to explain 
it. As he emphasizes, by 1900, the National Banking Act had already been interpreted to 
preclude multi-state banking.37 Arguably, this could have been because of a political 
distaste for concentrated financial power. Or, it could more simply be attributed to the 
fact that banks in each state wanted to evade competition from larger, out-of-state rivals. 
Inherently, the United States’s federal system had guaranteed state banks a local 
oligopoly – unless federal law permitted national banks to leapfrog over state boundaries. 
Banks in smaller jurisdictions naturally feared that larger banks in New York or other 
major cities would compete business and clients away from them if interstate banking 
were facilitated.  
 Thus, that state banks resisted legislation giving national banks such multi-state 
banking powers is hardly surprising. Although, from Roe’s perspective, the restrictions 
placed on interstate banking can be viewed as an expression of hostility toward 
                                                 
36
 Roe does recognize this timing problem, but much of his book is still focused on the restrictive laws 
regulating banking, mutual funds, pension funds, insurers, and takeovers that were adopted during the New 
Deal or afterwards. The Glass-Steagall Act, separating commercial and investment banking, was enacted in 
1933. The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulated mutual funds and effectively required them to be 
highly diversified. In Roe’s view, this precluded most mutual funds from holding large blocks. See Roe, 
supra note 17 at 104-105. Roe analyzes the regulation of takeovers and proxy solicitations and similarly 
views provisions in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (and the Williams Act, which was largely added 
in 1970 to the Securities Exchange Act) as intended to protect managers from shareholder control. Id. at 
151-168. All this may well be evidence of hostility to financial concentration, but it comes well after the 
separation of ownership and control. 
37
 See Roe, supra note 17, at 54-55. 
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concentrated financial power, the simpler interpretation is that local banks united to lobby 
for the preservation of the economic rents that a fragmented federal system gave them. 
To use a humble analogy, if one were mugged in a city alley, this could be viewed as a 
political act that expressed the egalitarian values (or at least the Robin Hood-like politics) 
of the assailant. But the simpler view is just that the mugger wanted your money. Thus, if 
one accepts Occam’s Razor and believes that the simpler hypothesis should be preferred, 
the Roe theory seems overly complicated. That is, a federal structure alone can explain 
fragmented banking power and may have precluded an efficient consolidation of 
financial firms – all without any need for resort to a political theory such as Roe offered. 
 A good case can also be made that, as of 1900, the largest, most powerful 
financial institutions in the United States did not want the combined ownership and 
control of industrial America. Rather than owning industrial companies, J.P. Morgan & 
Co., the dominant financial institution of the era, found it more profitable (as later 
described) to serve these companies and their shareholders as their financial advisor and 
underwriter. It was able during this period to exercise a degree of control without any 
ownership by quietly serving on the boards of these firms, and it profited greatly in so 
doing. But it (and similar firms) refused to grow into European-style universal banks; for 
example, they refused to hold large blocks of securities or to accept bank deposits from 
all but special clients.38 Such investments carried risks, and taking retail deposits required 
a large staff. Over time, the banks that took retail deposits did supercede Morgan and its 
                                                 
38
 As a wholesale and privately held bank, J.P. Morgan & Co. had neither public customers nor public 
shareholders. It would only accept deposits from the large corporations that it served. See Ron Chernow, 
THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance, (1990) at 
256. It first sold stock to the public in 1942. In opting to remain private, it allowed itself to be superceded 
in size by those banks that did take retail deposits. Id. at 304. But this was its voluntary decision, not the 
result of legal rules. 
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peers in size and scale, but J.P. Morgan & Co. and its fellow aristocrats opted for a leaner 
business model and may have profited more handsomely from their decision. Conversely, 
those financial institutions that wanted to expand found it possible to escape the 
restrictions on multi-state banking by forming separate securities affiliates, which several 
operated on a coast to coast basis.39 The case then has not been dispositively made that 
the restrictions on concentrated financial power were truly binding and could not be 
evaded. 
 From a global perspective, the major limitation of the Roe “political” thesis is that 
it works only for the United States. If it was more efficient for large financial institutions 
to monitor and control industrial corporations (as they did in Germany and Japan), why 
did not the U.K. evolve in this direction? None of the populist resentment of financial 
concentration stressed by Roe applied to the U.K., which had a very different political 
history than the United States. Yet, as will be seen, by the last quarter of the 20th Century, 
after following a quite different trajectory, the U.K.’s corporate ownership structure 
looked very much like that of the United States. 
 To explain the persistence of dispersed and concentrated ownership in different 
countries, Roe later moved to a more general political theory:  because left-leaning 
countries favor employees over shareholders, he argued, concentrated ownership persists 
primarily in such social democratic countries as a means of enabling controlling 
shareholders to maintain close supervision over their managers.40 If dispersed ownership 
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 Id. at 304 (discussing major banks, including the Chase Bank, that used securities affiliates to conduct a 
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 See Mark J. Roe, POLITICAL PRECONDITIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003); Mark J. 
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were instead to develop, managers would use their greater discretion under such an 
ownership system to favor the interests of employees over shareholders. Put differently, 
the inevitable conflicts between managers and shareholders (plus governmental pressure) 
would lead managers to subordinate shareholder interests to employee interests in these 
countries. But controlling shareholders could intervene to stop such behavior. 
 Plausible as this more generalized political theory may be, it seems counterfactual 
as applied to the U.K. As Brian Cheffins has convincingly shown, dispersed ownership 
developed in the U.K. during the extended reign of Labour Governments after World 
War II.41 Under Roe’s theory, the leftward drift of the U.K. during this period should 
have made controlling shareholders struggle mightily to preserve concentrated 
ownership. But they did not. Instead, it was precisely at this time that concentrated 
ownership in the U.K. exited – with a whimper, not a bang. Indeed, Cheffins concludes 
that “left-wing politics” may have accelerated the divorce of ownership and control in the 
U.K. because the threat of nationalization caused controlling shareholders to liquidate 
their blocks.42 
 In any event, Britain at no point restricted commercial banks with a Glass-
Steagall Act; nor did it chill institutional investors in their ability to communicate with 
regard to proxy solicitations or takeovers (as the U.S. once did aggressively and still does 
to a degree). Yet, even absent these restrictions, British financial institutions did not 
develop into German or Japanese universal banks; nor did they behave as activist 
monitors. At most, their level of activism was only marginally higher than that of U.S. 
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 See Cheffins, supra note 27, at 47-51. As he notes, “Britain had a left-wing government all but three 
years between 1945 and the election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives in 1979.” Id. at 49. 
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 Id. at 51. 
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institutions.43 The conclusion seems inescapable that law has been less of a restraining 
force than Roe has hypothesized. 
 The point here is not to claim that Roe’s political theory is invalid or that LLS&V 
were misguided in searching for the variables that distinguished countries with strong 
securities markets from those with weak ones. But broad brush strokes do not explain the 
evolution of dispersed ownership, and the convergence of the U.S. and the U.K. in share 
ownership requires a fuller understanding of both the business models of the principal 
intermediaries who guided this process and the special environments in which self-
regulation, not mandatory law, played a major role. 
II. The Spread of Dispersed Ownership in the United States 
 Dispersed ownership arrived in the United States during the first quarter of the 
20th Century, but the developments that paved its way began in the last quarter of the 19th 
Century. By that point, large industrial empires had formed in the United States in a 
variety of capital intensive industries:  chiefly railroads, steel, mining industries, 
chemicals and oil. Founder/entrepreneurs – men such as Carnegie, Vanderbilt, 
Rockefeller, and the DuPonts – controlled these empires, and in the normal course of 
events, succession problems would inevitably have arisen on the deaths of these founders. 
In Europe, control would typically stay within the family, or in few cases control would 
be sold at a premium to an incoming controlling shareholder. But control was seldom 
sold to the public. One can attempt to explain this difference by saying that Europe 
lacked an “equity culture” in which investors were ready to invest in shares, but that 
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response only begs the deeper question:  why did such a culture not develop? The greater 
obstacle, as earlier noted, was that control could not be successfully held by the public – 
at least with sufficient confidence to justify the payment of a substantial premium. Sooner 
or later, a new control seeker would surreptitiously assemble a control block and either 
squeeze out the public shareholders at a low price or leave them holding an illiquid 
security, while the new controlling shareholder extracted high private benefits of control. 
But events did not work out this way in the United States, and the reasons for its different 
evolution fall under essentially three headings: 
 A. The Role of Investment Bankers As Guardians 
 In 1877, Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt, then the richest man in America and 
the founder of the New York Central Railroad, died. The Commodore left a clearly 
unsuitable heir, William Henry Vanderbilt, who the Commodore had considered a 
“dunce” and exiled to farm on Staten Island, never training him in the business.44 William 
Henry Vanderbilt, who received 87% of the stock in the New York Central under the 
Commodore’s will, was not only untrained, but he quickly exacerbated a pre-existing 
political controversy between the railroad and the New York State legislature. In 1879, 
the New York State Assembly held hearings to investigate preferential rates that the New 
York Central was giving to some oil refiners. Public hostility towards the Vanderbilts 
was already growing, but it intensified exponentially in the wake of William Henry 
Vanderbilt’s clumsy testimony at these hearings and his infamous remark at this time 
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that: “The public be damned.”45 New York State appeared to be on the brink of imposing 
punitive taxes on the New York Central, in large part because of public animosity toward 
the Vanderbilts  and their unrivalled wealth.  
 Strategists for the Vanderbilts and the New York Central decided that the best 
way to protect their firm was to have William Henry Vanderbilt sell a large block of his 
holdings (some 250,000 shares) so that he would become only a minority shareholder and 
thus reduce the Vanderbilt association with the railroad. But such a sale was no small 
order and was in fact unprecedented. The problem was not only that public investors 
might be reluctant to buy, but that knowledge of this impending sale and thus of the 
overhanging excess supply of New York Central stock might cause its stock price to 
nosedive. 
 The sensitive assignment of conducting the sale of the Vanderbilt control block in 
the New York Central was given to J.P. Morgan & Company, largely because of its 
Anglo-American structure. Junius Morgan – the father of J. Pierpont Morgan and founder 
of the firm – had made the family’s fortune selling railroad bonds to British investors, 
and he still ran the London office. Not only did he have the trust of his British clients, but 
he could quietly sell New York Central stock to those clients without the scale of the 
massive distribution becoming apparent in the railroad’s home market in New York, 
where full disclosure would have caused its stock price to plummet. 
 But even sales to Morgan’s long-standing loyal British customers were not 
enough. To pull off this syndication, Morgan had to strike a truce with some of 
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Vanderbilt’s foes, including his arch-enemy, Jay Gould, who bought a large 20,000 share 
block in the offering.46 Gould and Vanderbilt had long operated competing lines and had 
bitterly battled for control of the Erie Railroad, sometimes engaging in intense price wars. 
But could these bitter rivals co-exist in peace? Or would Gould use his initial stake to 
mount a control fight, now that the ineffectual William Henry Vanderbilt held only a 
minority stake? 
 Although such an eventual control fight was a plausible scenario, it never 
materialized. Rather, it was precluded when J. Pierpont Morgan asserted himself. 
Demanding a board seat to represent “the London interest,”47 he skillfully used that seat 
and proxies from his British bondholder clients to take de facto control of the New York 
Central board. In so doing, he realized multiple objectives:  (1) he held off opportunistic 
control seekers (such as Gould and other Robber Barons of the era) who could not 
assemble a control position in the face of his opposition; (2) he served as an effective 
fiduciary and guardian for his distant British clients, thereby maintaining their loyalty and 
future business; (3) he was able to negotiate and maintain a truce between adversaries in 
an industry regularly characterized by ruinous competition (of the kind that economists 
applaud but shareholders dread); and (4) he used his pivotal position to earn fees for 
serving the New York Central as its principal underwriter and adviser, performing 
whatever services might be needed.48 
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 The episode assured J. Pierpont Morgan’s reputation for industrial statesmanship. 
Not only did he protect his overseas clients, but once on the board, he could guide an 
industry and steer it clear of “ruinous” price competition – thereby benefitting all 
shareholders in the industry (at the expense, of course, of consumers). His success was 
emulated, as the industry learned that investment banker control could be good for 
everyone (except consumers). Over time, the use of investment bankers as directors to 
share sensitive information among competitors and mitigate unnecessary competition 
became increasingly common, until Congress in the Progressive Era sought to end this 
practice in the Clayton Act, which barred interlocking directors – a move that was largely 
aimed at the perceived role of investment bankers as the engineers of pricing collusion. 
 Unique only in scale, the New York Central episode was far from an isolated 
incident. Earlier, J. Pierpont Morgan had gone on the board in other railroad battles to 
protect his British client/shareholders,49 and his father, Junius, had organized a “defense 
committee” to protect the firm’s British clients from the trepidations of Jay Gould in one 
of the many battles over the Erie Railroad.50 Rival investment banking firms appear to 
have also organized small shareholders to resist raids by Robber Barons intent on seizing 
control.51 Although J.P. Morgan & Co. had an unrivaled relationship with British 
investors, other prominent investment bankers had corresponding relationships with other 
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constituencies of European clients: Auguste Belmont had a longstanding relationship 
with the House of Rothschild and its largely French investors, while Joseph Seligman & 
Co. and Kuhn Loeb & Co. each represented groups of German investors.52 
 Historically, American investment banks grew up in the middle of the 19th 
Century to finance the construction of railroads across the American continent. Both 
because the United States was then a capital-importing nation and because the amount of 
capital required to build railroads across a continent was vastly greater than that required 
to build railroads between British or European cities, these investment banks had 
succeeded only to the extent they could gain the confidence of European investors. But 
because the railroad industry was often dominated by Robber Barons and other seeming 
buccaneers and because railroads often became overleveraged and entered bankruptcy, 
the maintenance of these relationships with distant European clients required American 
investment bankers also to serve these clients as guardians during the bankruptcy and re-
organization process. Although not unprofitable, this role prepared these bankers to 
similarly serve their clientele when the focus shifted from selling bonds to selling stock. 
Once again, their natural mission was to protect their European clients from well-known 
financial predators (of whom, the names Jay Gould, Jim Fisk, Russell Sage and Daniel 
Drew stood out). Moreover, because their predominant business continued to be the 
marketing of railroad bonds to European investors, the investment banks had strong 
incentives in their role as corporate directors to forego any opportunistic or self-seeking 
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conduct that might tarnish their reputations. J. Pierpont Morgan appears to have been 
particularly meticulous in this regard.  
 This pattern of directors serving on boards to protect dispersed shareholders 
quickly generalized, and by the turn of the 20th Century investment bankers, often several 
from the same firm, were on the boards of most major corporations, particularly banks, to 
protect both dispersed shareholders and management from perceived threats to control.53 
But the investment banks held small, if any, stakes in the corporations they so served. 
 Here, a central difference emerges between the American and European contexts: 
American investment banks remained agents and did not seek to take over industrial 
empires as the founders of those empires died off. Why not? Conceivably, they might 
have bought control of these firms with financing from their European clients. But such a 
strategy faced a variety of obstacles. First, it might have placed them in conflict with their 
European clients. Those clients wanted a safe stream of dividends and a liquid stock. Had 
J.P. Morgan & Co. sought, for example, to take the New York Central “private” 
(although that term was not yet known), the buyout group would probably have had to 
accept additional risk by increasing the firm’s leverage and surrendering the liquidity that 
the New York Central enjoyed as a New York Stock Exchange-listed security. This 
additional risk might have been unattractive to a clientele looking more for a safe 
dividend return. Equally important, a large scale buyout transaction was probably then 
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beyond the capacity of most American investment banks. In 1879, the Vanderbilt stake in 
the New York Central was estimated to be worth roughly $100 million.54 Yet, according 
to his biographer, J. Pierpont Morgan’s annual salary in the early 1870s was only $75,000 
per year – princely on a relative scale, but hardly suggesting that his firm could then 
consummate a major acquisition.55 In short, American investment banks were not then 
capitalized on the scale of the House of Rothschild or a major European universal bank. 
 Taking a firm “private” might also mean the end of a variety of lucrative fees that 
the investment bank received from a public corporation. J.P. Morgan & Co. typically 
served its public corporate clients in a variety of roles: underwriter, disbursing agent, and 
merger adviser. Put simply, serving dispersed shareholders paid well. 
 Finally, well understood as the idea of “going private” is today, it would have 
been far harder to conceive at that time because of the organizational challenges 
involved. J. Pierpont Morgan and his contemporaries were bond salesmen who knew 
little about running a railroad. In contrast, Vanderbilt was seen as a master of efficiency 
who had broad vision, understood the business cut costs and maintained a constant stream 
of dividends to his stockholders.56 Today, private equity firms know that they can buy the 
managerial talent to run an acquired business, but that insight was probably beyond the 
capacity of men experienced only at selling bonds to investors. 
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 For all these reasons, American investment banks performed as agents, rather than 
as principals, loyally representing both their domestic and European investors. On behalf 
of these shareholders (and managements), they sought to negotiate industrial peace and 
restrain competition by assisting industries to maintain collusive pricing. Later, during 
the Progressive Era, reformers became convinced that the primary function of investment 
bankers serving as directors was to police cartels.57 Certainly, investment bankers were 
well positioned to know the plans and strategies of rival firms and wished to curry favor 
with all sides. In fairness, it must also be remembered that price-fixing was not clearly 
illegal before 1890 (with the passage in that year of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act). In any 
event, the investment banker’s fiduciary loyalty ran to its investors, not to the public. For 
the investment banker, the rise of dispersed ownership meant increased fees from equity 
underwritings, increasing trading opportunities, and a variety of advisory roles. 
 That investment bankers as directors added value – both by protecting public 
shareholders and possibly by restraining competition within industries – is not simply a 
logical inference. Strong empirical evidence supports this claim. J. Bradford DeLong has 
found that, in 1911-1912, the presence of a partner at J.P. Morgan and Co. on a 
corporation’s board of directors added approximately 30 percent to that firm’s common 
stock equity value and about 15 percent to the total market value of the firm.58 Exactly 
why the presence of a Morgan partner resulted in such a significant market premium has 
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been debated. DeLong theorized that firms with a Morgan partner on its board could 
better replace inferior managers; other financial economists have argued that it gave such 
a firm better access to external finance.59 Both these hypotheses could be valid, but an 
alternative and simpler hypothesis may also be true: the 30% premium may reflect in part 
the reduced agency costs that a public corporation with a J.P. Morgan partner faced 
because it was less exposed to a coercive raid by a Gould or a similar predatory control 
seeker. In short, the Morgan partners of 1910-1911 might have been doing precisely what 
J. Pierpont Morgan did for much of his career:  protecting their shareholder clients from 
predatory control seekers, who might either manipulate the stock price or seek to acquire 
control without paying a control premium. 
 Undoubtedly, investment bankers on corporate boards faced conflicts of interest, 
and often they may have been more loyal to the interests of management than to those of 
the public shareholders. At times, investment bankers may have aligned with 
management. At other times, controlling shareholders used them so that they could sell 
their majority interest, thereby obtaining the benefits of diversification, while still relying 
on their investment bankers on the corporate board to protect their de facto control.60 In 
short, by playing a guardian-like role, investment bankers could accomplish multiple (and 
occasionally conflicting) objectives, sometimes protecting dispersed shareholders from 
external attack by the Robber Barons of this era, sometimes serving the interests of 
founders who wanted to remain influential while disposing of their majority block, and 
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sometimes fostering relationships with the new cadre of professional managers (while 
also assisting all of the above in policing price fixing and similar agreements that assured 
peace in the industry). Despite these multiple goals, the precondition to any sale of 
control to the public at an attractive premium was that the public shareholders believed 
that they would be able to retain control for the long-run. In this sense, the role of the 
investment banker was indispensible to the rise of dispersed ownership in the United 
States. 
 B. The Great Merger Boom of the 1890s 
 The United States experienced its first great merger boom between 1890 and 
1902. By some accounts, as much as one-half of U.S. manufacturing capacity was 
involved in mergers during this period.61 Often, these mergers involved most of the firms 
in an industry, and not infrequently they united firms that already had been loosely 
connected through trusts, loose price-fixing agreements, or holding company devices. 
The 1901 creation of U.S. Steel well illustrates this pattern. Negotiated by J.P. Morgan 
and Andrew Carnegie, it united a host of firms, accounting for the majority of the steel-
making capacity in the United States.62 Although intended to realize economies of scale, 
it also appears to have been the product of the growing potential for competition between 
Carnegie’s firm and smaller firms in the steel pipe and tube business that were sponsored 
by J.P. Morgan & Co.63 The result was America’s first corporation with a capitalization 
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of over $1 billion (at a time when the capitalization of all manufacturing companies in the 
U.S. just reached $9 billion).64 
 What drove these mergers? A popular, if much debated, view is that this merger 
wave was a response to the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. That Act 
outlawed price fixing, but did not prohibit mergers among competitors. Hence, if it was 
unlawful to fix prices across firms, but lawful to merger competitors into a single firm, 
the latter route became the preferred technique by which to avoid “ruinous competition” 
and achieve economic rents after 1890. 
 Although this theory has its critics,65 there is little doubt that this merger wave 
(whatever its cause) played a major role in the rise of dispersed ownership at the close of 
the 19th Century.66 Some of the best known mergers during this period – for example, the 
formation of Standard Oil and U.S. Steel – combined the majority of the firms in the 
industry into a single entity. Inherently, such industry-wide mergers diluted the 
controlling shareholders at individual firms and created dispersed ownership. At the same 
time, because these new combined entities were usually oligopolies, their enhanced 
market power explains why controlling shareholders would happily sell out in such 
transactions: they could receive a higher premium in a merger transaction because 
oligopolies create value for shareholders. Revealingly, Andrew Carnegie sold his 
company in the U.S. Steel transaction for bonds and took no stock in U.S. Steel.67 
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Clearly, he thought he was selling at the top of the market and at a value beyond that 
which any incoming controlling shareholder would pay him. 
 Skeptics doubt that antitrust law played a critical role in causing the merger wave 
of the 1890s, and they instead attribute that wave to the technological revolution caused 
by the growth of railroads.68 Railroads vastly increased the size of the market for 
manufactured goods and enabled manufacturers to profit from economies of scale. 
Improved communications – first the telegraph and later the telephone – also opened new 
and enlarged markets. Still, significant capital investments were necessary to introduce 
these economies of scale, and competition produced overinvestment and excess capacity. 
Alfred Chandler has observed that intense pressures developed within American industry 
to escape from competition, which pressures were “particularly strong in the new capital 
and energy-intensive industries where several entrepreneurs had simultaneously adopted 
new technologies of production.”69 In response, business leaders sought ways to reduce 
uncertainty and ensure high rates of return by reducing competition. Economists of this 
era even developed theories of “ruinous competition” to justify cartels and similar 
practices.70 Although price-fixing agreements were used, cartels prove unstable and 
tended to break down; in contrast, mergers produced a permanent consolidation that 
inherently reduced competition and ensured higher returns. 
 Ultimately, for our purposes, it is not necessary to choose between these 
overlapping theories of what caused this merger wave. Both explanations stress reasons 
why entrepreneurs turned to mergers, and investment bankers naturally rushed to 
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facilitate this new trend, thereby generating very high fee income. Historically, merger 
waves have been accompanied by stock market booms, and the 1895-1904 merger wave 
was no exception.71 For example, U.S. Steel’s shares soared from $38 when it was floated 
in 1901 to $55, but then plunged to $9 by 1903.72 Although it might reasonably be 
debated whether merger waves create stock market bubbles, or vice versa, the financial 
community, and the Morgan firm specifically, benefited from the phenomenon and saw 
mergers as a source of profits. Even if one is not willing to deviate from an assumption of 
strong market efficiency and doubts this stock bubble explanation, one can still fall back 
on the explanation that these transactions offered high premiums because they promised 
oligopolistic market power. Either way, the bottom line is the same:  mergers diluted 
blockholders and facilitated dispersed ownership. 
 The merger wave of the 1890s had its corollaries in England and Europe, but it 
was more pronounced in the United States, because in the United States (1) the 
technological revolution ushered in by transcontinental railroads had generated the 
greatest potential for improved economies of scale and enlarged markets; (2) the 
problems of overinvestment and excess capacity had repeatedly frustrated industry 
leaders in the U.S.; and (3) cartels remained legal in much of Europe, thus reducing the 
incentive to merge. Also, even if new technologies created potentially enlarged markets 
in Europe, these new markets intersected with national boundaries, where tariffs and legal 
issues restricted the full realization of the potential economies of scale. Hence, although 
mergers and industrial concentration increased throughout the industrialized world during 
this period, the rate of increased concentration was greatest in the United States. With 
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greater concentration through mergers came greater dispersed ownership. Once again, the 
historical evidence explains the rise of dispersed ownership without resort to legal rules 
protecting minority shareholders.  
 C. Self-Regulation and the Role of the New York Stock Exchange 
 Stock exchanges are natural allies of dispersed ownership. Because they profit 
from increased trading, they do better when the structure of share ownership involves 
many small shareholders who will constantly be making portfolio revision decisions and 
trading as a result. In contrast, controlling shareholders infrequently trade and inherently 
deprive the market of liquidity. 
 Stock exchanges developed in the U.S. and the U.K. well before the Industrial 
Revolution (principally to trade debt securities), but they grew exponentially in the wake 
of that revolution. Although stock exchanges existed in Europe, they encountered 
resistance there from the large banks who regarded them as competitors, and they 
actually shrank in size as the 20th Century dawned.73 During the late 19th and early 20th 
Centuries, the more centralized governance regimes in France and Germany were acutely 
conscious of the need to develop defense industries and sought to plan their economic 
development around this goal. They realized that they could better manage and direct 
economic development through a close partnership between the Ministry of Finance and 
the largest banks. In contrast, stock exchanges could not be as easily coordinated or 
controlled and were unpredictable in terms of how they would allocate capital. 
 Because the political economies of the U.S. and the U.K. were much more 
decentralized, these same issues of economic planning never arose. Indeed, the U.S. in 
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this era did not even have a central bank, and its banking structure was highly fragmented 
as the result of a Federal system that kept banks confined within a single state. Hence, in 
the absence of natural rivals or an activist state, stock exchanges grew more rapidly in 
these countries (particularly in the U.S.) and faced less resistance. But the stock 
exchanges in these two countries developed in different directions, and this helps explain 
the later arrival of dispersed ownership in the U.K. than in the U.S. 
 Unlike the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”), the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) faced stiff competition throughout the late 19th Century from other stock 
exchanges (indeed, more companies were listed on the Boston Stock Exchange as of 
190074). In response, the NYSE sought to develop its brand as a high-quality exchange 
that listed only “safe,” low-risk companies.75 Economic reasons underlay the different 
behavior of the two exchanges:  the NYSE was a closed exchange, which did not admit 
new members, but instead outgoing members sold their seats to incoming members. In 
contrast, the LSE was an open exchange, always ready to admit new brokers and list 
virtually any security that would trade.76 This difference created a stronger desire on the 
part of the NYSE to increase the value of its seats by enhancing the NYSE’s reputational 
capital.  
 Also, the NYSE employed fixed brokerage commissions, which naturally gave it 
a higher cost structure. Other exchanges could trade securities at lower cost, and this 
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particularly made the NYSE an uneconomic venue on which to trade lower-priced 
securities. Arguably, the NYSE made a virtue of this necessity by marketing itself as a 
selective exchange that would not list low-priced “penny” stocks. Clearly, there was a 
quality differential between the securities listed on the NYSE versus those listed on its 
rivals. The NYSE’s high listing standards also protected it from the danger that the 
failure of a high-risk company could cause the failure of a broker that dealt heavily in its 
stock, which latter failure would have broad repercussions because a broker’s failure 
would cause its liabilities to fall on all NYSE members.77 
 Given these differences in organizational structure, it logically followed that the 
NYSE took a more activist approach to listing standards and issues of corporate 
governance than the LSE. In frequently rejecting listings and insisting on an adequate 
earnings track record before listing an issuer, the NYSE was distinguishing itself from its 
competitors and marketing itself as the guardian of public shareholders. This guardian 
role manifested itself in two concrete ways:  (1) the NYSE, beginning in 1900, insisted 
that its listed companies publish annual audited financial statements, and (2) it protected 
shareholder voting rights by resisting attempts by issuers to deviate from the norm of 
“one share, one vote.”78 These steps were taken by a private body as a matter of self-
regulation, not mandatory law, but the result was to attract public shareholders to invest 
in NYSE stocks as safer and better monitored. 
 The point here is not that the NYSE was altruistic or public regarding, but that it 
pioneered dispersed ownership by engendering public confidence (which others later 
exploited). Although the NYSE was younger and smaller than the LSE, many of the 
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companies that listed on it became widely held shortly after 1900. As of 1913, the 
Pennsylvania Railroad had 86,804 shareholders; AT&T had 53,737 shareholders, and 
U.S. Steel, organized only in 1901, had 44,398 common shareholders and 77,420 persons 
holding its preferred stock.79 This degree of shareholder dispersion was measurably ahead 
of similar companies in the U.K. and few of these three companies had any clear 
controlling shareholder. 
 A distinctive feature of the spread of dispersed ownership in the United States 
was that retail shareholders, not institutional investors, were induced to buy the blocks 
sold by controlling shareholders. Of course, neither pension funds nor mutual funds 
existed to any significant degree at this point, and the major investment banks and 
merchant banks of this era largely avoided investments in speculative securities.80 Thus, 
individual shareholders had to be convinced that equity securities were more than 
speculative gambles. In part, the NYSE prepared the way for this transition by steadily 
communicating that its listed securities were sound and safe investments.  
 Well before 1900, the New York Stock Exchange had come to view itself as the 
guardian of the financial quality of the issuers listed on it. To be sure, its selective listing 
standards were for self-interested reasons,81 but they still contrasted sharply with the 
London Stock Exchange, which was basically prepared to list any company that could be 
traded. Identifying its interests with those of public shareholders, the NYSE began in 
                                                 
79
 See R.C. Michie, THE LONDON AND NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGES:  1850-1914 (1987) at 
222-23. 
80
 J.P. Morgan & Co. remained primarily a wholesale bond house and generally (but not always) avoided 
investments in speculative securities. See Chernow, supra note 38, at 305. J. Pierpont Morgan appears to 
have abided by his father’s iron rule to avoid speculative securities. Id. at 84. 
81
 The NYSE also feared that listing risky stocks would produce predictable insolvencies among its 
members when such a listed company failed. See Coffee, supra note 26, at 36-37. Indeed, the U.S. financial 
markets had witnessed several such panics in the late 19th Century. 
-42- 
 
1900 to require newly listing companies to publish audited financial information, and 
some financial historians date the advent of modern financial reporting from this 
moment.82 
 D. The Full Flowering of Dispersed Ownership:  1900 to 1930 
 1900 supplies a useful reference point. Based on data he compiled on share 
ownership at forty large companies as of 1900, Herman concludes that “the separation of 
ownership and control was already well advanced by the turn of the century.”83 
Specifically, he finds that only five of these forty companies (or 12 ½%) had a majority 
shareholder;84 these five were all industrial corporations, as railroads and utilities had 
already fully achieved dispersed ownership and uniformly lacked majority shareholders. 
 Thereafter, the pace quickened. Cheffin and Bank use data compiled by the 
National Civic Federation, which followed 75 large U.S. corporations from 1901 to 
1913.85 This roughly contemporaneous survey found that the aggregate number of 
shareholders in these 75 firms rose from 141,000 in 1901 to 415,000 in 1913.86 Similarly, 
Warshow followed the growth in shareholders in a different sample of 68 firms from 
1900 to 1923.87 Between 1900 and 1913, he found that the number of shareholders had at 
least doubled in 31 of these firms and that the aggregate number of shareholders in all 
rose from 342,000 to 769,000.88 
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 During the 1920s, the rate of growth accelerated. One measure of this growth is 
the number of companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges, which number rose from 682 in 
1900 to 970 in 1915 and, finally, to 2,659 in 1930. By one estimate, the number of 
individuals owning stock in listed companies rose from 500,000 in 1900 to 2 million in 
1920 and to 10 million by 1930.89 
 Driving this growth was, of course, a stock market bubble that arose and exploded 
at the end of the 1920s. Behind that bubble were again investment banks, but this time it 
was a different type of investment bank. Mass marketing and retail advertising were 
distinctively American inventions. Not surprisingly, some American underwriters proved 
to be as adept (or as irresponsible) at marketing equity securities as other American 
retailers were at selling cars, tobacco, soft drinks, or gasoline to the American public. 
During the 1920s, National City Bank, under its flamboyant CEO, Charles Mitchell, 
became the largest U.S. underwriter of securities, surpassing J.P. Morgan & Co. largely 
by applying mass marketing techniques to the sale of equity securities. Chernow 
describes Mitchell as bringing “a carnival tone to securities marketing” and turning his 
brokers into “garrulous hucksters.”90 These retail-oriented banks (which, unlike Morgan, 
did seek retail deposits and thereby gained greater underwriting and distributional 
capacity) were clearly in a different business from “wholesale” firms, such as J.P. 
Morgan & Co. and Kuhn, Loeb, but their style was distinctively American. During the 
1920s, several major banks (including Chase) incorporated separate securities affiliates 
so as to be able to outflank limits on interstate banking, and this enabled them to operate 
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coast to coast.91 By the end of the 1920s, the number of securities dealers in the United 
States had risen from 250 at the beginning of World War I to 6,500 by 1929.92 By 1929, 
in a nation of 120 million, some 1.5 to 3 million U.S. citizens regularly played the stock 
market.93 These new marketing techniques ultimately resulted in a record bubble and the 
Stock Market Crash of 1929, but by then dispersed ownership had become an 
accomplished fact. 
III. The Rise of Dispersed Ownership in the United Kingdom 
 Brian Cheffins has recently marshaled the evidence showing that dispersed 
ownership came later to the U.K. than to the U.S., probably arriving in fully developed 
form only after 1970.94 Some of the reasons for this delay have already been surveyed; 
the factors that accelerated the appearance of dispersed ownership in the United States 
were simply not present (at least to the same extent) in the United Kingdom. The 1890s 
merger boom was only faintly felt in the U.K. (possibly because British antitrust law was 
also much less developed); as a result, there was less dilution of U.K. controlling 
shareholders. Because the shareholders of the LSE (who were different from its brokers 
or seat holders) profited from selling new seats, the LSE had less interest in maximizing 
instead the value of existing seats. Desiring to trade any security that could be traded, the 
LSE was less selective about listings, did not impose corporate governance-related listing 
standards, and did not seek to present itself as a proactive guardian of public shareholders 
(as the NYSE did). Investment bankers in the U.K. neither needed to raise capital across 
the Atlantic nor confronted adversaries quite as predatory as the American Robber 
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Barons of the late 19th Century; hence, they were also less motivated to undertake a 
guardian role. Finally, the enormous and growing American middle class was convinced 
by retail-oriented underwriters to buy equity securities in the 1920s, while nothing similar 
occurred in the U.K. (possibly because of greater class stratification and wealth 
inequalities). 
 That dispersed ownership came to the U.K. does not seem to have been the result 
of any distinctive legal rules or judicial concern for the rights of minority shareholders. 
British academics agree that “from a legal perspective, the United Kingdom was not a 
protective jurisdiction for minority shareholders during the first half of the twentieth 
century.”95 In particular, the judiciary largely maintained a “hands-off approach,” and 
certain legal remedies, such as the appraisal remedy and the derivative action, were 
significantly less available than in the United States.96 Exculpatory provisions in 
corporate charters were common and enforceable, thereby undercutting the duty of 
loyalty,97 and shareholder ratification could waive most alleged breaches of a legal 
duty.98 Although U.S. legal remedies may have been marginally stronger in this period, 
the fairest generalization is that courts in both countries were reluctant to become 
involved in the internal affairs of a business corporation. Legal protections for minority 
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shareholders and the quality of disclosure improved in both countries after World War II, 
but this development followed, and did not precede, the separation of ownership and 
control. 
 From this perspective, the United Kingdom’s experience seems inconsistent with 
the hypotheses of both LLS&V and Mark Roe. Most obviously, the U.K. did not provide 
the legal protections for minority shareholders that LLS&V view as the precondition to 
dispersed ownership. Nor was the U.K. characterized by a populist distrust of 
concentrated financial power or by a federal system that fragmented financial institutions. 
Hence, under Roe’s reasoning, large financial institutions should have controlled most 
British corporations – but clearly such concentrated financial power did not arise until 
well after World War II. 
 Although not all commentators agree,99 dispersed ownership appears to have 
developed at a slower pace in the U.K. Initially, it spread within local communities (as in 
the United States), as companies sold shares to investors in the vicinity of their 
headquarters. Studying the shareholder records of 26 companies incorporated around 
1900, Julian Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi found that, as of 1910, 56% of the 
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common shareholders lived within six miles of the corporation’s headquarters.100 The 
New England textile mills had a similar experience, and both examples suggest that 
entrepreneurs can market their shares locally to investors who know them. To this extent, 
as Franks, Mayer, and Rossi argue, trust is probably more important than legal 
protections in encouraging investment,101 and trust was founded on personal 
relationships, which kept ownership local. Still, even if shares were being sold to local 
investors, control remained with the founders and their families; little, if any, evidence 
suggests that powerful financial institutions assembled significant stakes in these 
companies. 
 Moving forward to 1920, Franks, Mayer and Rossi used a random cross-section of 
53 companies quoted on the LSE and found that the largest shareholder held 20.8% of the 
shares; further, in only 43% of these companies did the largest shareholder own less than 
10%.102 Such evidence shows the glass to be half full:  non-controlling public 
shareholders owned the majority of the stock, but control was likely still in the hands of a 
small insider group. This pattern continued between the two World Wars. In a well-
known study, P. Sargant Florence compiled a data set, as of 1936, of 82 manufacturing 
and commercial companies and found that 59% of these companies had a “dominant 
ownership interest,” 32% were “marginal,” and only 9% had no dominant shareholder or 
                                                 
100
 See Franks, Mayer and Rossi, supra note 95, at 33-34. They further report that the median distance 
between shareholders’ addresses and the corporate headquarters was 15.4 miles. Id. at 33. 
101
 Id. at 31-32. 
102
 Id. at 19-20; see also Cheffins, supra note 27, at 12-14. In addition, Cheffins notes that the ten largest 
shareholders in this sample appear to have owned collectively on average some 43% of the stock. Id. at 
297. This suggests that a fairly compact and cohesive insider group held control. 
-48- 
 
shareholder group.103 In short, although these companies generally had a substantial 
number of shareholders, there was still no separation of ownership and control. 
 Three studies have focused on ownership concentration as of approximately 1950. 
One surveyed the one hundred largest U.K. manufacturers (as of 1970) and found that (as 
of 1950), a thin majority (50 out of 92) were still under family control.104 Franks, Mayer 
and Rossi, examined fifty-five listed companies, and found that 49% of these firms could 
be considered to be “widely held,” based on the criterion that no single shareholder held 
10% of the stock.105 This was marginally up from 43% in their survey for companies as 
of 1920, but the largest shareholder in 1950 held only 15% (down from their 20.8% 
figure for the largest shareholder in their 1920 survey).106 Finally, a follow-up study by 
Florence examined 98 “very large” manufacturing and commercial companies as of 1951 
and found 41% of them had a dominant shareholder, 42% were marginal, and 17% had 
no dominant shareholder.107 Thus, based on Florence’s data, between 1936 and 1951, the 
percentage of U.K. firms in which control and ownership had indisputably separated had 
nearly doubled – from 9% to 17%. This was change, but the Berle/Means model was still 
very far from well established. 
 Commentators have generally opined that “family capitalism” in the U.K. 
declined during the 1950s and 1960s.108 Channon finds that, of the 100 largest British 
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manufacturing companies, only 30% still had “family control” as of 1970.109 Still, large 
ownership blocks remained common. Leech and Leahy, using data from the 1983-1985 
period, surveyed 470 UK-listed companies and found 34% had a shareholder owning at 
least 20% and 61% had a shareholder owning 10% or more.110 Only with the 1990s does 
a study by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer find that large ownership blocks had 
largely disappeared, at least among the largest U.K. companies. Surveying the 20 largest 
UK publicly quoted companies, they find that none had a 20% blockholder and only two 
had a 10% blockholder.111 Other, more recent studies, employing much larger samples, 
have replicated this result, finding in common that the vast majority of U.K.-listed 
companies lacked a shareholder owing a 25% block.112 In the absence of such a large 
shareholder, ownership does appear to have at last become separated from control. 
 This does not mean, however, that evolution of dispersed ownership in the U.K. 
followed the American pattern. One difference stands out:  in the U.S., the appearance of 
broadly dispersed ownership preceded the rise of the institutional investor, but in the 
U.K., it clearly followed their rise and was dependent on it. That is, U.S. public 
corporations had become widely held during the first quarter of the 20th Century – well 
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before the rise of institutional investors, which came largely after World War II in both 
countries (with the U.K. again lagging marginally behind the United States). Thus, in the 
United States, the transition went through three stages: from family control to broadly 
dispersed retail ownership to its current form of dispersed institutional ownership. In the 
U.K., that middle step appears to have been largely omitted, with the transition instead 
being directly from family control to institutional ownership. This is an important 
simplification because it clarifies who were the sellers and who were the buyers, enabling 
us to focus on what caused them to transact. 
 In overview, three different forces converged to produce a delayed separation of 
ownership and control in the U.K.:  (1) the rise of institutional investors; (2) an active 
merger market, which included the liberal use of hostile takeovers; and (3) tax laws that 
pressured controlling shareholders to sell control and that invited institutional investors to 
buy it. 
 A. The Growth of Institutional Ownership 
 As of the early 1930s, individual investors held over 80% of the securities traded 
on the LSE, and even as of 1957, individuals still held 66% of the shares of public 
companies in the U.K.113 But within a dozen more years, this percentage fell to less than 
a majority.114 By 1991, pension funds and insurance companies together held 51% of the 
shares of U.K. public companies, up sharply from 9% in 1957 and 33% in 1975.115 Unit 
trusts and investment trusts – collective investment vehicles resembling the American 
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mutual fund – held a much smaller percentage of shares, probably never exceeding 8% 
prior to 2000.116 In the early 1980s, the lines crossed for individuals and pension funds, 
with individual ownership falling from 66% in 1957 to around 20% in the early 1990s, 
while pension funds rose from under 5% in 1957 to a peak of over 30% around 1993.117 
The mathematically inescapable fact about the structure of share ownership in the U.K. is 
that institutions were persistent buyers and individuals persistent sellers from at least 
1957 to at least the early 1990s.118 
 What explains this pattern? No comprehensive description will be attempted of 
why one group was consistently optimistic and the other consistently pessimistic over so 
long a period. The answer probably lies more in the fact that institutional investors (most 
notably insurance companies and pension funds) had limited alternatives to equity 
securities to fund their own future obligations. That individual investors sought exit over 
this long a period can be explained by multiple factors:  (1) a general stagnation in the 
British economic outlook from 1957 through the early 1990s; (2) an increasingly 
regulatory stance taken by U.K. corporate law (which may have reduced the private 
benefits of control for controlling shareholders and so encouraged them to sell119); (3) a 
merger boom which did offer attractive premia, and, most of all (4) changing tax 
considerations that forced controlling shareholders to liquidate their blocks. This desire 
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for exit was accommodated by the rise of institutional investors in the U.K. But the 
appearance and growth of U.K. pension funds seems an exogenous fact, attributable to 
the Labor Government’s egalitarian agenda and not explainable in terms of any desire to 
influence corporate governance. 
 B. The British Merger Movement 
 Franks, Mayer and Rossi measured changes in ownership structure on a decade-
by-decade basis for a sample of 60 companies throughout the 20th Century (40 of which 
companies were incorporated around 1900 and the other 20 around 1960).120 They 
conclude that the “overwhelming use to which equity issuances were put,” both in the 
first and second half of the 20th Century in the U.K., was to fund mergers and 
acquisitions.121 To the extent that incumbent blockholders were diluted, mergers then 
were the primary cause. Similarly, Florence followed some 30 “very large” firms that he 
classified as “owner controlled” as of 1951 and finds that 25 of these 30 companies 
experienced major changes in ownership structure between 1951 and 1980, generally as 
the result of merger activity.122 During this brief period, each of these 25 companies 
eliminated two tier capitalization voting structures that gave founder/insiders greater 
voting rights. 
 Although, prior to the middle of the 20th Century, mergers had been relatively 
uncommon events in the case of firms listed on the LSE, some 43% of publicly listed 
commercial and industrial companies in the U.K. were taken over between 1957 and 
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1969.123 In substance, the U.K. experienced a merger wave in this era that was 
functionally equivalent to the U.S. merger wave of the 1890s. The leading difference was 
that many of these acquisitions were made by conglomerates and do not appear to have 
been attempts to organize oligopolies or increase market share. Sometimes, the acquirer 
would already have dispersed ownership, and sometimes it would have a controlling 
shareholder group. Either way, repetitive mergers produced an acquisition-driven dilution 
of ownership. In addition, as the Florence data discussed above indicates, an acquirer that 
wished to make acquisitions using its stock as currency needed to eliminate those features 
(such as unequal voting rights or non-voting classes) that made its stock an unattractive 
currency. Hence, control blocks weakened in a variety of ways. 
 C. The Role of Tax Law 
 Brian Cheffins’ careful analysis of the rise of dispersed ownership in the U.K. 
places tax incentives at center stage. Tax considerations both (1) induced blockholders to 
liquidate their blocks, and (2) encouraged institutional investors, who enjoyed relative tax 
immunity, to buy. 
 On the sell side, high corporate tax rates, and particularly an excess corporate 
profit tax imposed on the eve of World War II, eclipsed corporate profits.124 An 
especially punitive feature of the post World War II tax system was a provision that 
denied “director controlled” companies the ability to deduct remuneration paid to 
employee directors.125 Individual income tax rates also soared up to a maximum taxable 
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rate of 95% for taxable income over 20,000 pounds.126 The combination of high tax rates 
and the denial of a deduction for remuneration paid to insiders serving on the board 
essentially eliminated managerial employment as an attractive private benefit of 
corporate control.127 British tax law was also dividend unfriendly, as such investment 
income was subjected to a special surcharge.128 
 Estate taxation probably provided the principal motive for blockholders to exit. 
Following World War II, the Labour Government raised death duties across the board, 
with the 50% rate beginning at estates exceeding 100,000 pounds and with the maximum 
rate being 80%.129 To avoid such confiscatory taxation, tax planners urged controlling 
shareholders to sell their control blocks prior to death and make inter vivos transfers. In 
this process, family businesses usually sold their control blocks and then placed the cash 
proceeds of these sales into long-term trusts.130  
 On the buy side, pensions and insurance received relatively favorable tax 
treatment, thus creating a stronger market for these products.131 Probably as a result, the 
total financial assets of pension funds grew 32 times between 1952 and 1979, and by the 
1970s, pension funds accounted for approximately one-third of all personal savings in the 
U.K.132 As money flooded into pension funds, there was little practical alternative for 
money managers but to invest in equity shares. Insurance companies also increased their 
allocation of assets to equities from 10% in 1946 to 16% by 1956 and to 21% by the early 
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1960s.133 Exchange controls, initially introduced in 1947, greatly limited the ability of 
U.K. institutional investors to invest in foreign equities.134 As a result, U.K. capital was 
“trapped” in domestic equities (which did at least outperform fixed income securities 
during this period). These exchange controls were largely abolished in 1979, but by then 
dispersed ownership had largely arrived. 
IV. A Comparison of the U.S. and the U.K. Experiences 
 The first conclusion is the simplest:  Exogenous factors largely explain the rise of 
dispersed ownership in both the U.S. and the U.K. In the U.S., the merger wave of the 
1890s provides the factor that best explains the timing of this transition. In the U.K., tax 
considerations similarly supply the primary explanation for the break-up of family 
ownership. High income and estate taxes, partly necessitated by World War II and partly 
the product of a Labor Government intent on achieving a more egalitarian distribution of 
wealth, forced blockholders to exit, and the tax-induced flood of money into pension 
funds and insurance products created a new class of buyers. Corporate and securities law 
played little role in inducing this transition. Arguably, but for the U.S. merger wave and 
the changes in the U.K.’s tax laws, dispersed ownership might have remained only a 
minority pattern and not the principal form of ownership in both countries. 
 More, however, must be said. In explaining the appearance of the Berle/Means 
corporation in the U.K., Cheffins disagrees with Franks, Meyer and Rossi.135 Cheffins 
places the British tax laws at stage center in his account, while Franks, Meyer and Rossi 
give greater emphasis to the creation of trust and the impact of mergers. Who is right? At 
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least in part, their disagreement may stem from their focus on different developments. In 
overview, the separation of ownership and control needs to be broken into two stages:  
(1) the appearance of substantial dispersed ownership among minority shareholders; and 
(2) the eventual break-up of the control blocks that still dominated these firms as of the 
foregoing stage. In the U.K., the appearance of firms with large and numerous minority 
owners came well before the dilution of controlling blockholders, while in the U.S. much 
less of a time lag separated the two stages. Although the U.K.’s tax laws may explain the 
dilution of controlling blockholders, they cannot explain earlier broad dissemination of 
stock into public hands. Retail investors did not buy stock because controlling 
shareholders faced tax problems. Here, Franks, Meyer, and Rossi properly emphasize the 
role of mergers and the creation of trust.136 Trust is an ineffable quality and is usually 
based on personal knowledge. As a result, few entrepreneurs could hope to establish 
sufficient personal contacts to generate trust on the part of a broad class of minority 
shareholders, and ownership was therefore likely to stay local (as Franks, Meyer and 
Rossi find that it did in the U.K. until well into the 20th Century).  
 This finding should not surprise. A strong bias in favor of domestic securities on 
part of international money managers has been well established in the economic 
literature, and even domestic money managers exhibit a strong preference for firms 
locally headquartered near their offices.137 Whether one explains this investor preference 
in terms of trust or asymmetric information, the fact remains that investors tend to prefer 
geographically proximate investments. As a result, for ownership to disperse beyond a 
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localized region, professional intermediaries may play a necessary role to build trust (or 
reduce informational asymmetries) beyond the geographic region in which the 
entrepreneur is personally known. The U.S. experience illustrates how underwriters could 
develop trust on a trans-Atlantic basis and serve as bonding agents in order to elicit 
foreign shareholder investment. This process was probably more visible in the U.S. 
because the U.S. was a capital-importing nation until after World War I and greater 
efforts were needed to attract foreign capital. To the European investor, the 19th Century 
railroad wars between rival American Robber Barons resembled the Wild West. Before 
the U.S. could successfully present itself as an attractive venue for European investors, 
special bonding measures were necessary. The House of Morgan initiated and perfected 
this process by placing its directors on corporate boards. Although U.S. law did little to 
ease the anxieties of foreign investors, U.S. intermediaries – both investment bankers and 
the New York Stock Exchange – filled this void. 
 In the transition to the next stage in which control blocks are diluted, an active 
merger market in both countries (but peaking at different times) appears to have hastened 
the transition to dispersed ownership by offering sellers a higher premium than they 
could expect to receive ordinarily from buyers in the secondary market. Because the U.S. 
merger wave of the 1890s essentially offered stockholders enhanced market power, it 
inherently promised them the equivalent of a control premium. Also, firms that did not 
join in the formation of such industry-wide oligopolies faced the risk of being excluded 
and thereby made worse off. Thus, there was an element of coercion in the break-up of 
U.S. blocks during this merger wave, just as the British tax laws later supplied an even 
clearer degree of coercion to induce control dilution. 
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 British heightened merger activity in the 1950s and 1960s cannot be as easily 
explained. The conglomerate merger movement of this era no longer appears to have had 
a strong foundation in economic efficiency. Still, controlling shareholders of acquired 
firms already had tax-motivated reasons to sell and thus may have welcomed merger 
transactions at lower premiums than they otherwise would have demanded. The only 
practical alternative for blockholders seeking to avoid estate taxes was to sell into the 
secondary market on the LSE, where prices were also arguably inflated by the strong, but 
similarly tax-induced, demand for securities on the part of pension funds and insurance 
companies. 
 Nowhere in this story do the legal rules protecting minority shareholders play an 
important role. The most important protection accorded to U.K. minority shareholders 
during this period – i.e., the elimination of unequal voting rights – was the product not of 
mandatory law, but of voluntary action by acquiring firms in order to enable them to use 
their shares as merger currency. 
 Viewed through the prism of Roe’s political theory, the dispersion of share 
ownership and the death of “family capitalism” in the U.K. did have a political cause 
(i.e., high tax rates and death duties that were imposed by a Socialist government seeking 
to redistribute wealth), but this impact on share ownership seems not to have been 
foreseen. For those on the Left, the breakup of family capitalism was an unintended, but 
probably serendipitous, result. 
 In both the U.S. and the U.K., private ordering and self-regulation played decisive 
roles. In the U.S., the House of Morgan and the NYSE developed bonding devices that 
made equity investments in the U.S. attractive to foreign investors. In the U.K., 
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institutional investors quickly filled the void left by controlling shareholders and lobbied 
for practices (such as the Takeover Code) that significantly reduced the private benefits 
of control.  In this light, the centrality of private ordering and industry “best practices” 
may give a continuing relevance to the work of LLS&V. Their efforts to prove the 
superiority of the common law to the civil law have encountered nearly unanimous 
skepticism from legal scholars. But, in their later re-interpretations, they have suggested 
that the specific elements of the common law that they find correlated with strong capital 
markets may be only proxies for deeper differences between the governance regimes of 
“common law” economies and “civil law” economies. Those deeper differences may 
include the greater receptivity (or at least tolerance) for private ordering and self-
regulation. Capital markets began to develop in the U.K. and later in the U.S. during the 
18th Century (and arose even earlier in The Netherlands). All three countries were 
pluralistic and relatively decentralized societies in which political and economic power 
were separated. In contrast, France and Germany were far more centralized states in 
which the governments sought to plan and channel economic growth and investment.138 
As a result, in the U.S. and the U.K., private ordering was given greater room in which to 
function, and this gave rise to self-regulatory institutions (such as the NYSE and LSE). 
These self-regulatory bodies were flexible and able to adapt relatively quickly to new 
circumstances. Viewed in this light, in the turn-of-the-century United States, J. Pierpont 
Morgan may have been the ultimate self-regulatory authority, relied upon by the markets 
to quell panics and by industries to establish a collusive peace and order. 
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 To sum up, in the U.S. and the U.K., intermediaries and self-regulatory bodies 
played necessary and critical roles, both in establishing the institutional mechanisms 
necessary for creating trust and in regulating markets. They were able to do so because 
the political and legal environment gave them greater space in which to operate and did 
not directly control or supervise them. In this sense, LLS&V were correct to search for 
the fundamental differences in social and economic structures of different societies, and 
the decentralized political and economic structure within the U.S. and the U.K. may have 
been the critical variable that explains their convergence. 
V. The Persistence of Passivity: Why Don’t Institutional Investors  
Reunite Ownership and Control? 
 
 As retail shareownership has declined and institutional ownership has 
concentrated, the separation of ownership and control could end, as institutional investors 
reunite the two in the U.S. and the U.K. By the early 1990s, the 25 largest institutional 
investors in a U.K. public company had come to hold roughly one-half of its stock, while 
in the U.S. the corresponding figure would have been a roughly one-third ownership.139 
In principle, coalition formation is feasible in both countries, if somewhat easier in the 
U.K. In reality, the degree of concentration may be even higher, both because pension 
funds typically delegate decisions to an even more limited number of professional fund 
managers and because many (and possibly most) institutional investors rely upon a 
limited number of professional proxy advisers with regard to voting decisions.140 Finally, 
proactive hedge funds have appeared whose basic business model involves searching for 
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opportunities to participate in corporate governance – apparently in the belief that by 
challenging management (“rattling the cage” in the vernacular), they can raise the stock 
price. Thus, numerous commentators have suggested that institutional investors could (or 
should) end the separation of ownership and control.141 
 Nonetheless, this pattern of concentrated institutional ownership has been in place 
for over two decades, and the basic tendency of institutional investors to remain passive 
has not changed dramatically.142 What explains the persistence of passivity? Two basic 
answers can be given: 
 A. The Costs of Coalition Formation 
 Coalition formation among institutional owners is simpler and easier in the U.K., 
both because share ownership is more concentrated and because the typical institutional 
investor owns a larger stake in the equity market. As of the early 1990s, Prudential 
Corporation, the largest British insurer and also the largest British shareholder, owned 
some 3.5% of the British stock market.143 Many other institutional investors owned 
slightly smaller amounts in the 1 to 2%, whereas the largest U.S. institutional investor 
then owned or managed less than 1.5% of the larger U.S. equity market.144 Prudential 
estimated as of this time that it held some 900 U.K. stocks and held a 5% or greater stock 
in “probably 200 companies.”145 But it would seldom exceed a 10% stake.146 Hence, even 
for the largest institution in a concentrated market, it is a safe estimate that assembling a 
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majority voting block would require it to gain the support of probably over twenty 
additional institutions.147 
 Of course, this is costly, both in terms of out-of-pocket costs (such as legal fees) 
and diverted executive time. But there are at least three additional complications 
associated with coalition formation: 
 1. The “Race to the Exit” Scenario. Institutional investors in the U.K. have 
reported that attempts at coalition formation could backfire if those approached learn that 
a leading investor is dissatisfied. Because the implicit message is thus that a major 
investor is unhappy with management (and may therefore sell its stock unless changes are 
implemented), other investors face a dilemma:  if the large (and usually “overweighted”) 
investor organizing the coalition fails in achieving its purpose, it will likely reduce its 
holdings and drive down the stock price.148 For the institutions so approached by it, the 
choice is whether to join the coalition or “race for the exit” and sell before the news 
becomes public. Moreover, because the process of organizing the coalition and then 
challenging management would take a number of months, it may be obvious that adverse 
publicity and a war of contending press releases will follow during which the corporate 
management’s competence and/or integrity will be challenged. Because of this fear of an 
early “rush to the exit,” some institutions reported that they would be careful in terms of 
the institutional investors they contacted to join a prospective coalition, thereby reducing 
the field of eligible coalition candidates. 
                                                 
147
 This estimate assumes that the original proponent held nearly 10% and needed to obtain an additional 
40%. 
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 Id. at 2061-62. Other investors might also believe that the investor seeking to form this coalition had 
material adverse information that it was not willing to share. Id. at 2062. 
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 This problem is probably less severe in the U.S. where the holdings of the 
institutional investor seeking to organize the coalition will typically be smaller (and 
probably under 5%). But, the more concentrated the institutional market, the greater the 
fear of a “race to the exit.” 
 2. The Passivity of the “Underweighted.” The normal expectation in the U.K. is 
that the institutional investor who organizes a coalition of investors to negotiate with 
management will be “overweighted” – that is, it will own a higher percentage of the 
company’s stock than its overall share of the U.K. market.149 Sometimes, such an 
“overweighted” investor has even been assigned the role of lead organizer by U.K. 
authorities.150 Although it is not surprising that an investor with a large stake will be more 
motivated to challenge management than a small investor, the point here is subtler. One 
institution holding 1.0% of the U.K. market might be “overweighted” in a particular stock 
and own 2%; another investor might also own 2% and yet be “underweighted” because it 
owned 2.5% of the U.K. equity market. Only the first investor is perceived to be willing 
to take on the costs and effort of coalition formation. 
 Why? Because institutions are locked in a competition for investors’ funds, which 
turns largely on their relative performance, none wants to help its competitors. Yet, an 
“underweighted” firm essentially does that when it bears expenses to change 
management or policies at a corporation in its portfolio; the result is to benefit its 
“overweighted” rivals in that firm more than itself. Thus, “underweighted” institutions 
tend to remain passive; they may vote with a coalition but not contribute to the costs of 
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collective action.151 This likely passivity of “underweighted” institutions means again 
that only a limited number of institutions can be expected to lead or fund organized 
shareholder resistance. 
 3. The “Free Rider” Problem. Even when an institutional investor is willing to 
vote with an activist coalition of fellow shareholders, it does not follow that it will 
contribute to their common defense on a pro rata basis. In a well-known episode in the 
early 1990s, institutional investors organized and removed the board of Tace PLC.152 
This revolt was led by Norwich Union, an insurance company that held a 5% block in 
Tace and whose chief financial officer then chaired the Institutional Shareholders’ 
Committee. Although the institutions succeeded in ousting the founder and chief 
executive officer of Tace, who held a 23% block, the victory was arguably a Pyrrhic one, 
because Norwich Union was forced to split a substantial legal bill with one other 
shareholder, as all the other institutions in the group declined to contribute.153 Because 
Tace was a relatively small corporation, it is uncertain that this same coalition of 
investors would have been able to undertake a more costly campaign against a larger 
company. 
 More importantly, if other coalition members cannot be induced to contribute, 
then those organizing the coalition will rationally invest funds only if they believe that 
collective action will produce an expected benefit to the corporation or to its share price 
that, when divided by their percentage of stock ownership, equals their costs. That is, for 
a 5% shareholder to expend $1 million in costs, it would have to anticipate $20 million in 
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gains to the corporation or its aggregate stock price.154 This is a mathematics that will 
deter most activists most of the time. 
 B. The Liquidity/Control Tradeoff 
 The foregoing problems of coalition formation are mitigated if institutional 
investors hold larger stakes. Roe and others have argued that institutions would take such 
larger equity positions but for regulatory constraints that deter them. There is clearly 
some truth to this argument in the United States, where a variety of regulatory provisions 
do discourage institutions from holding large blocks.155 Yet, although similar restrictive 
rules are not in force in the U.K., the same pattern persists. 
 The simple truth is that institutional investors are generally unwilling to sacrifice 
liquidity.156 Thus, even in the absence of legal restrictions in the U.K., Prudential and 
other institutional investors reported themselves to be extremely “cautious” about 
exceeding the 10% level in any stock for fear of losing liquidity.157 Small institutions 
may also fear a loss of diversification if they hold very large blocks, but the fear of 
illiquidity is common to most all institutional investors. Yet, if institutions feel compelled 
to hold less than 10% to preserve liquidity, the task of coalition formation is made more 
difficult – particularly when no mechanism exists to induce pro rata cost sharing among 
coalition members. 
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 It is possible that some institutions may believe that there is a general deterrent benefit from curbing 
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 To generalize, investors that want liquidity must surrender control.158 As a result, 
a basic control/liquidity tradeoff arises. A few institutions (most notably, hedge funds) 
may be able to accept relative illiquidity and so are more able to participate in control, 
but others (such as mutual funds) find the need for liquidity to be paramount and so 
remain generally aloof from control and corporate governance disputes. 
 Although liquidity is the primary concern, other factors also constrain institutional 
activism. As noted earlier, a large indexed institution may own the securities of 900 or 
more corporations.159 Neither pension funds nor mutual funds have the logistical capacity 
to monitor such portfolios in detail. To be sure, they can use professional money 
managers and can rely on proxy advisors with regard to voting issues. But mutual funds 
in particular need to economize on their costs to remain competitive, and this further 
constrains their monitoring capacity. To the extent that they do rely on outside 
consultants, they are likely to receive advice and voting instructions based on rules of 
thumb or industry best practices, and not an in depth, specific evaluation of a company’s 
management. In any event, in interviews, institutional investors regularly stress that they 
are stock traders and portfolio managers, not management consultants.160 
 The claim here is not that institutional investors will never intervene (clearly, they 
have). Some (such as hedge funds) may be more proactive because they have accepted 
illiquidity and a lack of diversification as part of their business model. But such 
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 In the U.S., there are many legal restrictions (Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, insider 
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institutions will not be broadly marketed to most investors and so will not predominate. 
As a result, institutional passivity seems likely to remain an enduring characteristic of 
dispersed ownership systems. 
 To be sure, their level of passivity is not fixed and can be influenced by legal 
rules. The rise of hedge funds and recent regulatory reforms in the United States (most 
notably, “access to the proxy” statement161) may result in more challenges to incumbent 
managements. But these are differences of degree, not of kind. 
 In short, a reunification of ownership and control appears unlikely so long as 
dispersed ownership persists as the dominant structure of share ownership in a 
jurisdiction. This does not mean that dispersed ownership cannot be superceded. Canada 
supplies an example of a jurisdiction that has gone from a dominant system of 
concentrated family ownership to dispersed ownership and then back to family ownership 
– all within a half century.162 But dispersed institutional owners seem likely for the 
foreseeable future to remain more distant and aloof from management decision-making 
than traditional controlling shareholders. 
CONCLUSION 
 Inherently, scholarship involves a continuing debate between “lumpers” and 
“splitters.” Academic glory normally goes to the lumpers, who generate grand theories by 
operating at a high level of abstraction. Yet, eventually the tide turns as too much 
inconsistent evidence turns up. The recent literature on global corporate governance has 
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been a heyday for lumpers, with provocative meta-theories advanced by a number of 
incisive theorists, most notably Roe and LLS&V. But gradually the “splitters” begin to 
re-assert themselves, dissecting and dismantling overbroad generalizations. That process 
is now well underway. Across a variety of jurisdictions, splitters are finding that strong 
legal rules protecting minority shareholders were not a precondition for dispersed 
ownership to arise. Instead, intermediaries could and did structure private ordering 
mechanisms that protected minority shareholders.  
 This conclusion should not surprise. Studies of contemporary emerging markets 
also find that, particularly in countries with weak legal protections, firms with higher 
corporate governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in the stock market.163 
To be sure, not all firms will seek to bond themselves in this fashion (because the private 
benefits of control may often be more valuable). Thus, the availability of such private 
mechanisms do not alone induce the widespread breakup of control blocks. Rather, the 
fuller history of dispersed ownership must recognize the role of historical contingencies 
(merger waves in the U.S. and tax laws in the U.K.). Nonetheless, the fact the U.S. and 
the U.K. did converge on a similar pattern of share ownership was neither because of 
their “common law” roots nor similar political histories. The most that can be said is that 
both countries encouraged and accepted private ordering and self-regulation.  
 By no means do these conclusions imply that there is little role for theory. 
Similarities between the political economies of the U.S. and the U.K. – most notably their 
decentralized governance, their separation of political and economic power, and their 
preference for private ordering – do stand out and may have played a significant role in 
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the rise of dispersed ownership. Further modeling is thus needed of the relationship 
between political economies and financial markets. Finally, because firms with dispersed 
ownership are known in all markets, their ubiquity seems to imply that private ordering 
can create enduring, stable firms in which ownership and control are separated in 
virtually any legal or political environment. To be sure, such mechanisms are used only 
sporadically. But precisely because entrepreneurs only sometimes seek to maximize share 
value through such arrangements, that is the phenomenon (not mandatory legal rules) that 
most merits future study. 
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